Abstract. Mission decision-making is one of the most important techniques for cooperative combat of multiple unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), while game theory is an efficient method in solving mission decision-making. In this paper, the game theory is applied to the air combat decision of multiple UCAVs. Then a weapon model for UCAVs' air-to-air missiles is proposed to obtain the basic probability value of the D-S evidence theory. In order to obtain the Nash equilibrium point, the bimatrix problem is transferred into an optimization problem. In this way, the function "linprog" in MATLAB can be used to obtain the optimal solution, which can greatly simplify the steps of solving the bimatrix problem. Finally, the optimal strategy is obtained by optimizing calculation. Series of experimental results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach in solving the multiple UCAVs cooperative air combat decision problem.
Introduction
Following with the development of unmanned combat aerial vehicles' (UCAV) technology, cooperative unmanned aerial vehicles control will receive a great attention in the future. For many military missions, it is unthinkable to be taken on a single UCAV. And more instances show that it is more complicated and expensive to exploit a single UCAV than to create a multiple UCAVs' system. Wang, H.L. analyzed a maneuvering-decision method for air-to-air combat [1] , Yang, Y.C. proposed quantitative air combat decision approach in [2] , and Wang, Y.N presented an intelligent differential game on air combat decision [3] . Yao, Z.X. also presented the game theory model to solve this problem, and tests prove that it can conduct the mission decision-making effectively [4] , But these approaches to establish the basic probability value and solve the bimatrix are very complicated.
To overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings, we present a weapon model of UCAVs' air-to-air missiles to obtain the basic probability value. In order to solve the bimatrix, we transfer it into an optimization problem first, and then the function "linprog" in MATLAB is used to solve the optimization problem. Furthermore, we apply the method on the issue of multiple UCAVs air combat, and design corresponding strategy sets. Finally, series of experimental results are given to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach in solving the multiple UCAVs cooperative air combat decision problems.
Introduction to Related Theories

D-S Evidence Theory
D-S evidence theory is proposed by Dempster in 1976, then his student Shafer develops and organizes it into a comprehensive mathematical theory. Through synthesizing several evidences, D-S evidence theory can improve the dependable degree of the proposition, now the theory has specifically applied on some areas, such as multiple sensors network, medical diagnosis and so on. In D-S evidence theory, the combinatorial formula is very important [5] . If θ is the discriminating frame, 2 θ is the aggregate composed by all its subsets, m 1 , m 2 are the basic probability values of the independent authentic function of 2 θ , A i and B j are the focus respectively, then the D-S combinatorial formula is:
Where Φ is the empty aggregate,
is the focus to be fused.
Game Theory
Game theory, defined mathematically by Nash J.F [11] , has found its first applications in economics, especially to solve the problems concerning the decisions that have some effects on different and often competitive fields.
In a model of game theory, three elements must exist. They are players, strategy set, and criterion. Each player has its own strategy set and its own criterion. When a game begins, each player searches its own best strategy in its search space to improve its own criterion with all the rest criteria fixed by others players. So there exists the exchange of strategies among the players. The frequency of exchangeδ is called the Nash frequency, generallyδ=1, which means the exchange of best strategies happens at the end of each generation. When no player can further improve its criterion, it means that the system has reached a state of equilibrium called Nash equilibrium [6] .
We take a two-player game to present the process of Nash equilibrium. Let A be the search space for the first player, B the search space for the second player, a strategy pair (x*, y*) ∈ A⋅ B is said to be a Nash equilibrium iff:
Where A f is the gain for the first player, B f is the gain for the second player.
Mission Decision-Making Method
A Mission Scenario
The red UCAV formation attacks the blue ground target, its main task is to attack the blue airport (G 1 ). The formation includes an unmanned fighter-bomber (R 1 ) and m-1 UCAVs (R 2 ,R 3 ,…,R m ). The unmanned fighter-bomber's mission is to bomb the blue airport and the other UCAVs are to help it complete the bombing mission. m-1 UCAVs are exactly the same, i.e. they have the same flight performance and weapon performance. Each UCAV carries several air-to-air missiles and they are their main tools for fighting. Air-to-air missile's shooting average is determined by q situation factors (such as distance, angle and speed
) in a battlefield situation. The unmanned fighter-bomber's maneuverability is lower. Except for air-to-air missiles it carries air-to-surface missiles to bomb the blue airport yet. (In the following paper , we don't distinguish the unmanned fighter-bomber and the m-1 UCAVs and all are named as UCAVs).
The blue k UCAVs (B 1 ,B 2 ,…,B k ) composed an attack formation. Their mission is to prevent the fighter-bomber from bombing the airport and annihilate them. The UCAVs in the formation are also exactly the same, i.e. each UCAV carries air-to-air missiles and they are their main tools for fighting. Air-to-air missile's shooting average is determined by q situation factors (such as distance, angle and speed
The blue strategy set
includes w strategies. The aggregate composed by the blue k UCAVs is defined as WU. The aggregate composed by all subsets of the WU is 2 WU , so in the blue strategy set, the strategy α i : denotes the blue puts the UCAVs in aggregate T i1 attack the target R 1 cooperatively, puts the UCAVs in aggregate T i2 attack the target R 2 cooperatively and so on.
The red strategy set
The aggregate composed by the red m UCAVs is defined as DU. The aggregate composed by all subsets of the DU is 2 DU , so in the red strategy set, the strategy β i :
denotes the red puts the UCAVs in aggregate T i1 attack the target B 1 cooperatively, puts the UCAVs in aggregate T i2 attack the target B 2 cooperatively and so on. Therefore the model of game theory in this paper is:
,N = {1, 2}, 1 denotes the blue formation (including k UCAVs), 2 denotes the red formation (including an unmanned fighter-bomber and m-1 UCAVs). S 1 is the blue strategy set, S 2 is the red strategy set. u 1 is the blue payoff function, u 2 is the red payoff function.
Evidence Syntheses
D-S evidence theory uses the synthesis of multiple evidence to make decision. It has a great deal of flexibility in dealing with the unknown and uncertainty. In this paper, the high-level evidence is obtained through the synthesis of low-level evidence until the effectiveness (income) and the invalidity (price) of some attack (or defense) strategy are obtained.
The D-S basal combinatorial formula of the mission decision-making method is below:
denotes the basic probability value when the n-th UCAV in blue formation attacks the t-th UCAV in red formation considering q momentum factors ( in this paper q=3, i.e. the distance between two UCAVs, the speed of the UCAVs and the angles between the UCAVs).
The basic probability value when the blue p UCAVs attack the red t-th UCAV cooperatively can be expressed as follows:
The basic probability value when the blue selects the strategy α i can be expressed as follows:
The basic probability value when the blue p-th UCAV attacks the red t 1 -th, t 2 -th…t q -th UCAV at the same time can be expressed as follows:
By the same token, we can synthesis the red every evidence 
is defined as the blue payoff function when the blue selects the strategyα i and the red selects the strategyβ j .
is defined as the red payoff function when the blue selects the strategyα i and the red selects the strategyβ j . can be obtained.
The Acquisition of the Basic Probability Value
In order to get the For example, when the blue i-th UCAV calculates its own basic probability value against the red j-th UCAV, the α i in Fig.1 stands for the angle composed of the blue ith UCAV's velocity vector and its line of sight towards the red. The α j stands for the angle between the red j-th UCAV's velocity vector and line of sight towards the blue.
In addition, the basic probability value is defined when the uninhabited fighterbomber bombs the airport as:
By searching the database, the basic probability values can be obtained. If the number is not the existing numbers, it can be sought through the linear relationship. For example, if the distance between two UCAVs is d km, its corresponding basic probability values are: 
Solving the Bimatrix
The bimatrix problem can be transferred into an optimization problem [7] , and the bimatrix are as follows: In MATLAB, "linprog" is an efficient function to solve the above optimization problem. In this way, the Nash equilibrium point can be obtained.
If there is no optimal value, the mixed strategies needs to be solved. Assume 
Simulation Experiments
In order to investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed hybrid game theory and D-S evidence approach, a series of experiments are conducted in this section. Scenario   Fig. 2. Multiple UCAVs battlefield situation (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 belongs to the red, and B 1 , B 2 , B 3 belon gs to the blue) The blue strategy set:
Mission
The red strategy set: 
Simulation Results
The blue payoff matrix:
The red payoff matrix:
By calculating, the conclusion can be obtained : The blue should select the strategy
and the value of its payment is 0.5426. The red should select the strategy
and the value of its payment is 1.843. The blue and red target allocation results can be shown with Fig 3 and Fig 4. It is obvious that the target allocation is reasonable. In reality, they are corresponding with the actual situation. The simulation results demonstrate the proposed approach to multiple UCAVs cooperative air combat decision is feasible and effective. 
Conclusions
This paper has proposed hybrid game theory and D-S evidence approach to multiple UCAVs cooperative air combat decision. Series of experimental results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach in solving the multiple UCAVs cooperative air combat decision problems. Our future work will focus on applying the proposed hybrid method to real multiple UCAVs cooperative air combat in more complicated combating environments.
